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ABSTRACT
This paper shows that the effect of capital account liberalization on growth depends upon the
environment in which that policy occurs. A theoretical model demonstrates the possibility of an
inverted-U  shaped  relationship  between  the  responsiveness  of  growth  to  capital  account
liberalization and institutional quality. Three empirical specifications based on the model are
estimated using a panel of 71 countries. Estimates of all three specifications support the hypothesis
of  a  non-monotonic  interaction  between  the  responsiveness  of  growth  to  capital  account
liberalization and institutional quality, with about one-quarter of the countries, those with better (but
not the best) institutions exhibiting a statistically significant and economically meaningful effect of
capital account openness on economic growth.
Michael W. Klein
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1. Introduction 
 
The positive experience of industrial countries that opened up to international 
capital flows since the early 1980s, and the boom in emerging market economies during 
the first half of the 1990s, bolstered the argument that an open capital account promotes 
growth and development.  But, in the wake of the economic and financial crises in 
emerging markets in the latter part of the 1990s, critics questioned the wisdom of this 
type of economic integration.  These critics include well-respected mainstream 
economists who strongly favor free trade in goods and services, but maintain that trade in 
assets fundamentally differs from trade in “widgets.”  For example, in an influential 
article published in Foreign Affairs in 1998, Jagdish Bhagwati wrote “substantial gains 
[from capital account liberalization] have been asserted, not demonstrated …” (p. 7).  In a 
similar vein, Dani Rodrik (1999) warned “Openness to international capital flows can be 
especially dangerous if the appropriate controls, regulatory apparatus and macroeconomic 
frameworks are not in place.” (p. 30).  By the end of the decade, a report by the 
International Monetary Fund (2000) stated that the Executive Board of that institution 
“…has emphasized the substantial benefits of capital account liberalization, but stressed 
the need to carefully manage and sequence liberalization in order to minimize risks.” 
Reviewing this topic, Kenneth Rogoff, then the Chief Economist and Director of 
Research for the IMF, wrote in the December 2002 issue of the IMF’s publication 
Finance and Development “These days, everyone agrees that a more eclectic approach to 
capital account liberalization is required.” (p. 55).  
A careful reading of the warnings advanced by Rodrik, the Executive Board of the 
IMF, and Rogoff, however, does not suggest that open capital accounts cannot have a    2
salutary effect; rather, they argue that the environment in which capital account 
liberalization occurs is a potentially important determinant of its consequences.  But the 
conditions under which capital account liberalization contributes to economic growth are 
not evident from previous published empirical research.   
Earlier empirical literature offers conflicting results concerning the effect of 
capital account openness on growth.
1  Quinn (1977), who includes an indicator of capital 
account openness in a standard growth regression, provides the first evidence that an 
open capital account promotes growth.  Klein and Olivei (1999) show that an open 
capital account is associated with greater financial depth and, through this channel, it can 
promote growth.  The results presented in Grilli and Milesi-Ferretti (1995), however, 
show no effect of an open capital account on growth.  Rodrik (1998) demonstrates that 
capital account openness may only serve as a proxy for institutional quality and have no 
independent significant effect in a growth regression. Edwards (2001) and Arteta, 
Eichengreen, and Wyplosz (2003) investigate the effect of a linear interaction between 
the capital account liberalization indicator and income per capita in cross-country growth 
analysis, with the former finding a significant effect for higher income countries while 
the latter, using somewhat different estimation techniques, finding no significant effects.  
The results presented in this paper help resolve the ambiguity of this earlier 
empirical work since the empirical specification used here nests specifications in 
previous research.  This specification is based on a neoclassical growth model developed 
in Section 2 that focuses on the manner in which institutional quality affects the impact of 
                                                           
1 See the survey by Edison, Klein, Ricci and Sløk (2004).    3
capital account liberalization on growth.
2  Institutional quality, in this model, affects the 
extent to which savings are protected from expropriation and it also affects the premium 
borrowers pay for funds from abroad.  The effect of institutional quality on the steady 
state level of output differs when there is an open capital account as compared to when 
there is autarky.  The responsiveness of growth to capital account liberalization reflects 
the relative values of these two steady states.  Therefore, institutional quality affects this 
responsiveness and, in particular, a key result is that it may vary in a non-monotonic 
manner with institutional quality.   
This model provides a theoretical foundation for the analysis of the effect of 
capital account liberalization on growth presented in Section 3.  Consistent with this 
model, the results presented in this section provide evidence of an inverted – U shaped 
relationship between the effect of capital account liberalization on growth and 
institutional quality.  About one-quarter of the 71 countries in the sample, those with 
better (but not the best) institutions exhibit a statistically significant and economically 
meaningful effect of capital account openness on economic growth.  This result is robust 
to different specifications of the interaction between institutional quality and an indicator 
of capital account openness.  Thus, the results presented in this paper offer conditional 
                                                           
2 In its focus on the interaction between the capital account and institutional quality, this 
paper is related to other recent research.  Castro, Clementi and MacDonald (2004) 
develop a model in which the positive effects of investor protection on growth are 
strongest for countries with more open capital accounts because access to international 
capital holds interest rates steady even as better institutions increase the demand for 
investment.  They also present cross-country evidence consistent with this model. Along 
another dimension, Alfaro, Kalemli-Ozcan and Volosovych (2003, 2005) present cross-
country evidence that capital inflows are significantly and positively affected by 
institutional quality.    
    4
support for a policy of capital account liberalization, with the quality of domestic 
institutions serving as an important determinant of whether integrating into the world 
capital market delivers on the promise of more rapid economic growth. 
 
2. Capital Account Liberalization, Institutional Quality, and Growth  
The model presented in this section illustrates how the effect of capital account 
liberalization on the growth rate of a small open economy depends upon the quality of its 
domestic institutions.  Institutional quality in this model affects the extent to which 
domestic savings translate into investment as well as the premium demanded by 
foreigners when investing in the domestic economy.  Section 2.1 presents a neoclassical 
growth model of a small open economy with two types of capital under the conditions of 
financial autarky whereby all capital is funded from domestic savings.  An alternative 
version of this model for a small open economy, one that includes partial capital mobility 
(following Barro, Mankiw and Sala-i-Martin 1995) is presented in Section 2.2.  Section 
2.3 models capital account liberalization by drawing on the solutions for the autarkic and 
partial capital mobility cases.  The model shows that, for reasonable functions relating 
institutional quality to expropriation and the risk premium, the responsiveness of growth 
to capital account liberalization, while positive, may first increase, and then decrease, 
with higher levels of institutional quality. As discussed in Section 3, the empirical results 
support this inverted U-shaped relationship between the responsiveness of growth to 
capital account liberalization and institutional quality. 
 
    5
2.1  Steady State Output and Growth under Financial Autarky  
The model used in this paper has two types of capital, K and H.  The distinction 
between these types of capital relates to whether they can serve as collateral when 
borrowing from abroad.
3  Thus, under financial autarky, the situation studied in this 
subsection, there is little difference in the characteristics of K and H but, as discussed 
below, an important difference exists between these two types of capital when 
international borrowing and lending occurs.  
The production function for this economy includes K and H, as well as L, the 
number of workers, and E, the efficiency of labor, and is given by  
[1]  
β α β α − − =
1 ) (EL H K Y  
where Y is output, and both α and β are between 0 and 1. We study the model with the 
variables expressed in terms of effective units of labor, and define y = Y / EL, k = K / EL 
and h = H / EL. Using these variables, the production function is 
[2] 
β αh k y =    
  The model attempts to capture the link between institutional quality and the 
responsiveness of growth to capital account liberalization through the effect of 
institutional quality on the return to savings.  The parameter representing institutional 
quality in this model is q (0 < q ≤ 1) with larger values of q indicating better institutions.  
In this model, the quality of institutions affects the rate of expropriation of capital by 
                                                           
3 Barro, Mankiw and Sala-i-Martin (1995) identify H as human capital, a natural 
interpretation since expected future wages typically cannot serve as collateral.  It is 
reasonable, however, to broaden the definition of H to other types of capital as well.  For 
example, differential collateral requirements exist for foreign direct investment and 
international portfolio investment, a point stressed by Froot and Stein (1991) in their 
model of the link between the real exchange rate and foreign direct investment.    6
governmental or private actors who are not appropriately constrained by law, as captured 
by the function x(q).  This function represents the proportion of savings that contributes 
to physical investment, with x'(q) > 0 and x(1) = 1.  This function appears in the capital 
accumulation equations for both K and H under autarky, when both types of capital can 
only be accumulated through domestic savings, as shown in the two equations in [3], that 







































, sK is the proportion of savings devoted to the 
formation of K, sH is the proportion of savings devoted to the formation of H, and δ is the 
rate of depreciation of both types of capital.
4   
The steady state value of output per effective unit of labor of this economy under 
financial autarky, 
*
A y , is  
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4 In addition to q affecting the use of savings, the quality of institutions could also affect 
the savings rate.  In this case, we could posit the relationships  ) (q sK  and  ) (q sH , where 
0 ) ( ' > q sK  and  0 ) ( ' > q sH . This would not change the qualitative effects of institutional 
quality in this model since  [] [ ]
0
) ( ) (
, 0
) ( ) (
> >
dq
q x q s d
dq
q x q s d H K .   Also, it would be 
straightforward to allow for different x(q) functions for the two types of capital.    7
Naturally enough, steady state output per effective unit of labor in autarky is higher with 
a higher level of institutional quality (a higher value of q) because better institutions lead 
to a higher proportion of savings being used for productive investment.   
  Below we will compare the dynamic path of output per effective worker under 
autarky and under partial capital mobility.  A Taylor-series expansion around the steady 
state yields the differential equation for output per effective unit of labor under autarky 
 [5]  () () ( ) () []
* ln ln 1 A y y g n
y
y
− + + − − − =
•
δ β α . 
 
2.2  Steady State Output and Growth with Partial Capital Mobility  
With no restrictions on its movement, and no cost of adjustment, capital would 
move instantaneously to capital-scarce countries and equalize rates of return across 
nations.  A model with this feature would have no meaningful transition dynamics.  The 
results of such a model are obviously at odds with experience.  A more reasonable result 
is obtained if one assumes partial capital mobility, whereby there is perfect international 
capital mobility for some types of capital but not for others.  Barro, Mankiw and Sala-i-
Martin (1995) formalize this concept by assuming that physical capital, K, can serve as 
collateral and, as such, can be fully funded by foreign borrowing while H cannot serve as 
its own collateral.  In an economy that is credit-constrained, H can only be accumulated 
through domestic savings.
5   
                                                           
5 A country is credit-constrained if the overall value of its assets that can serve as 
collateral, K, is less than or equal to the value of its debt, D, where D = (K + H) – A, and 
A is the overall value of assets of an economy. In the model below, we assume that the 
credit constraint is binding (else there would be no transition dynamics).      8
When K can serve as collateral in international asset trade, the amount of physical 
capital per effective worker, k, is determined by an equilibrium condition that sets the 
marginal return of capital equal to its marginal cost. The marginal return of capital is the 
marginal product of capital net of its rate of depreciation and net of expropriation.  
Institutional quality affects the rate of expropriation and, therefore, the premium that 
must be paid to foreign lenders.  This premium is assumed to be a negative function of 
institutional quality, v(q), where v'(q) < 0  and v(1) = ε where ε is a small premium 
associated with international lending, even in the presence of no expropriation.    The 
arbitrage condition for k is, therefore, 







where rW  is the (exogenous) world interest rate.  This equilibrium condition holds 
regardless of whether or not a country is capital constrained.  An analogous equilibrium 





equation given in [3] determines its path of accumulation.   
  The steady state levels of h and y in a credit-constrained economy are obtained by 
using the equilibrium condition for k (Equation [6]) in the steady state, and the steady 
state value of h consistent with the equation of motion for that variable in Equation [3].   
The steady state level of output per effective unit of labor under this assumption of partial 
capital mobility, 
*
G y , is  
 [7]  ()
() ( )
























G .    9
As in the case under autarky, steady state output per effective unit of labor is higher with 
a higher level of institutional quality when there is partial capital mobility since x'(q) > 0  
and v'(q) < 0.  A distinction between the effect of institutional quality on the steady state 
levels of output under partial capital mobility and under autarky arises because k is 
financed through foreign lending in the former case while it is financed through domestic 
savings in the latter, and institutional quality has different effects on these two sources of 
financing investment. 
  The differential equation that describes the dynamic path of an open economy is 
  [8]            () () []















.  Comparing this result to the differential equation for an 
autarkic economy in equation [5], we see that the rate of convergence is more rapid for a 
country with partial capital mobility than for a country that operates under financial 
autarky (a point noted in Barro, Mankiw and Sala-i-Martin 1995).    
  
2.3  Solutions and Empirical Specification 
  The empirical specification of the effects of capital account liberalization on 
growth, and the demonstration of how this effect depends upon institutional quality, 
draws on the solutions to the differential equations for an economy under financial 
autarky, [5], and for an economy with open capital markets, [8].
6  These solutions, 
                                                           
6 This use of the model to generate an empirical specification is similar to Mankiw, 
Romer and Weil (1992) who develop an estimating equation from a standard Solow 
growth model.    10
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allow us to determine the average rate of growth of output per effective unit of labor over 













, when an economy has a liberalization of its capital 
account at time F (where   0 ≤ F ≤ T).  The indicator of capital account openness in this 
model, κ, represents the proportion of years between year 0 and year T that a country has 
an open capital account, and is defined as  
T
F T −
= κ . 
Thus, 0 ≤ κ ≤ 1, with κ = 0 for a country that that is closed throughout the period and κ = 
1 for a country that is open throughout the period.
7    Assuming continuity in the path of 
output between the time before and the time after the liberalization of the capital account, 
the solution for the average rate of growth of output per effective unit of labor for an 
economy that spends the first (1 – κ)T years with a closed capital account and the 
remaining κT years with an open capital account is 
[9]
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7 It is worth noting that κ, the proportion of years that a country has an open capital 
account, directly corresponds to the standard indicator of capital account openness used 
in empirical analyses, including the empirical analysis presented in Section 3 of this 
paper.
  See Edison, Klein Ricci and Sløk (2004) for a discussion of the different 
indicators of capital account openness used in empirical studies.    11
where C represents the term in curly brackets in the first line and S represents the term in 
square brackets in the first line.
8  
  Variables included in the term S in [9] include those that represent the 
determinants of the steady state of an economy that has an open capital account for the 
proportion κ of the period T.  In particular, κ, the proportion of time spent with an open 
capital account, is one of these variables.
9  A Taylor-series expansion of S around its 
constituent variables gives us the linear specification  
















where Z is a row vector of variables other than κ that affect S, the coefficients on these 
variables are the elements of the column vector B, and both γ and the elements of B are 
obtained from the first-order Taylor series expansion of S.  In the case of γ, the expansion 
around κ = 0 gives us  
 [10]  ( ) () () ( ) []
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8 The parameter – (C/T) represents the coefficient on the initial income term in a growth 
regression, and 0 < C < 1 (for example, C=0.32 when α=0.3, β=0.3, n=0.01, g=0.02, 
δ=0.05, κ=0.5 and T=20). As noted above, this model suggests that the rate of conditional 
convergence is more rapid for countries with more time spent with an open capital 
account since, with reference to [9],  0 >
κ d
dC
.  However, the results presented in Section 3 
do not support a significant difference in conditional convergence associated with κ. 
9 Note that  () ( ) ( )
* 1 ln 1 A
T y e S
λ α − − − =  when κ = 0, and  ( ) ( )
* ln 1 G
T y e S
λ − − =  when κ = 1.   
    12
where  () () ) 1 (
1 1 T ae
κ α λ − − −  is, for reasonable values of α, β, n, g, δ and T, between 0 and 1.
10  
The result in [10] shows that γ, representing the effect of a given value of κ on growth, is 
bigger when steady state output with open capital markets, 
*
G y , is large relative to steady 
state output with closed capital markets, 
*
A y , since κ
  reflects the proportion of time 
during the period 0 to T with open capital markets.
11 
 Institutional  quality  affects  γ through its effect on the steady state values of  
*
A y  
and 
*
G y .  More precisely, using the result in [10], we have  
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For reasonable parameter values, the term in curly brackets in [11] is positive and, when 
this is the case, the relationship between γ and q may not be monotonic.
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 if, in absolute value,  ( ) ( )
dq
q v r d W + +δ ln
 is large relative to 
()
dq
q x d ln
 since, in this case, the improvement in institutional quality has a relatively big 
                                                           
10 The term  () () ) 1 (
1 1 T ae
κ α λ − − −  is equal to 0.7 for κ = 1, and to 0.431 for κ = 0, when T = 
20 (the number of years in the sample used in the empirical analysis presented below), 
and the values of α, β, n, g, and δ are the same as those listed in footnote 8.  
11 Note that γ can be positive even if 
*
G y  < 
*
A y  since  ( )( ) 1 ) 1 (
1 1 < −
− − T ae
κ α λ . 
12 In fact, using the parameter discussed above, the term in curly brackets in [11] equals 
0.174 for κ = 0, 0.318 for κ = ½, and 0.030 for κ = ¾ .    13
effect on 
*
G y  as compared to its effect on 
*





 when  ()
dq
q x d ln
 is large 
relative to the absolute value of  ( ) ( )
dq
q v r d W + +δ ln
 since, in this case, an improvement in 
institutional quality has a relatively big effect on 
*
A y  as compared to its effect on 
*
G y . 
  Specification of particular functions of x(q) and v(q) enable us to explore further 
the relationship between γ and q, and, in particular, to demonstrate that the model can 
generate an inverted-U shaped relationship consistent with the empirical results presented 
in the next section. Consider the functions  












where the logarithm of the parameter X represents the semi-elasticity of the protection of 
savings against expropriation with respect to the quality of institutions (X > 1) and the 
parameter V represents the semi-elasticity of the real premium paid on foreign funds with 
respect to institutional quality (V > 0).   There is an inverted – U shaped relationship 
between γ and q if there is some value of institutional quality q* between 0 and 1 such 














13  For these functions, q
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13 These functional forms meet the requirements outlined above that x'(q) > 0, v'(q) < 0, 
x(1) = 1, and v(1) is small for appropriate values of V.   Of course, the functions presented 
here are not the only ones that can generate this inverted–U shaped relationship between 
γ and q. A sufficient condition for q* to represent a maximum value is x"(q*) ≤ 0 and 
() () ( )
2 ) * ( * *) ( q v q v r q v W ′ > + + × ′ ′ δ .    14
  The central point here is that, for a range of values of X and V, q* is positive and 
less than 1.  This is demonstrated in Table 1 in which q
* is shown to have values between 
0.469 and 0.702 when X equals 6, 10, or 14, and V equals 8, 10 or 12, and the value of the 
other parameters are those used in earlier discussion.  Thus, the largest effect of capital 
account liberalization on growth occurs among countries with good, but not the best, 




*Associated with Maximum γ 
  V = 8  V = 10  V = 12 
Q
*  0.702 0.585  0.503  X = 6 
Γ 0.0214  0.0220  0.0225 
Q
*  0.669 0.559  0.481  X = 10 
Γ 0.0218  0.0226  0.0231 
Q
*  0.651 0.544  0.469  X = 14 
Γ 0.0221  0.0229  0.0235 
α = 0.3, β = 0.3, n = 0.01, g = 0.02, δ = 0.05, 
κ = 0.5 T = 20, rW = 0.04 
 
  The non-monotonic relationship between γ and q is further illustrated by Figures 
1a and 1b which trace out γ for values of q between 0.3 and 1.0.  Figure 1a  
presents this relationship for three different values of X (6, 10, and 14), given V = 10, 
while Figure 1b shows how γ varies with q for three different values of V (8, 10, and 12) 
when X = 10 (thus the middle line in each figure, representing V = 10 and X = 10, is the 
same across the two figures).
15  These figures show that γ, while consistently positive, 
first increases, and then decreases, with q, reflecting the differential effects of q in the 
                                                           
14 The result in [13] also shows that q
* is decreasing in both X and V and that the savings 
rates, sH  and sK  do not affect q*, although they do affect the maximum value of γ. 
15 The parameter values used to generate these figures are the same as those used up to 
this point.       15
two functions x(q) and v(q).  The value of γ associated with q* is about 10 percent bigger 
than its value when evaluated at q = 1 for the cases of V = 10 and X = 10, as well as for 
the cases where V = 14 and X = 10 and V = 10 and X = 14.  The value of γ evaluated at q* 
is between 20 and 25 percent larger than its value at q = 0.3 for each of the three cases 
depicted in Figure 1a, while, for the cases depicted in Figure 1b, the maximum value of γ, 
relative to its value at q = 0.3, ranges from 10 percent larger (for V = 12) to 46 percent 
larger (for V = 8). 
  The results presented in Table 1 and Figures 1a and 1b suggest that there may be a 
non-monotonic relationship between the responsiveness of growth to capital account 
liberalization and institutional quality.  These results are obtained through the use of 
particular functional forms, but other reasonable specifications of x(q) and v(q) could also 
generate an inverted-U shaped relationship between γ and q (see footnote 13).  Different 
functional forms for x(q) and v(q), however, can produce a monotonic relationship.  
Ultimately, out interest is in the empirical relationship between γ and q.  We next turn to 
this question and show that, in fact, the data supports an inverted-U shaped relationship 
between γ and q.  Furthermore, the estimated values of γ presented in Section 3 are 
similar to those generated in the model developed in this section. 
    16
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3. Empirical Estimates 
  This section presents an empirical analysis of the manner in which the 
responsiveness of economic growth to capital account openness depends upon an 
indicator of institutional quality.  This analysis considers the performance of 71 countries 
over the twenty year period 1976 to 1995.  The indicator of capital account openness for 
country i, κi, is based on the data in the IMF’s Annual Report on Exchange Arrangements 
and Exchange Restrictions, and its value represents the proportion of the years between 
1976 and 1995 that this publication reports that country i had an open capital account (0 ≤ 
κi ≤1). The indicator of institutional quality, Qi , represents, for country i,  the average of 
five series from the International Country Risk Guide, published by the PRS group, with 
higher values for each of the five series representing better institutional quality.
16 
  We use these data, along with macroeconomic data, to estimate three 
specifications that, in different ways, allow for a possible non-monotonic interaction 
between institutional quality and capital account openness.  These specifications are 
presented in Section 3.1.  The preferred specification includes interactions between κ, the 
capital account openness indicator, and Q, Q
2 and Q
3.
17  The estimates from this 
                                                           
16  This empirical indicator of κi corresponds directly to the definition of κ in the model in 
Section 2. The empirical indicator of institutional quality ranges from 2.45 to 7.22, with a 
median value of 4.36.  The data appendix provides details on these two indicators. 
 
17 The inclusion of the cubic term allows for greater flexibility then if the specification 
only included the interaction terms κ ×Q and κ ×Q
2 and, of course, the specification with 
three interaction terms nests the specification with two interaction terms.  These 
interactions also effectively nest the Edwards (2001) and Arteta, Eichengreen, and 
Wyplosz (2003) specifications that include a linear interaction between the capital 
account openness indicator and initial income, since institutional quality is strongly 
correlated with initial income per capita (see Klein (2003) and the discussion in Edison, 
Klein, Ricci and Sløk (2004)).  Also, by separately including Q, the specification 
presented here nests the one used in Rodrik (1998).    18
specification are of an inverted–U shaped relationship between the responsiveness of 
economic growth to capital account openness and institutional quality.   The two other 
specifications presented in Section 3.1 also yield a similar non-monotonic relationship.  
Furthermore, the estimated economic importance of open capital markets can be quite 
pronounced for countries with an appropriate level of institutional quality. 
 
3.1 Specifications 
  An empirical specification that allows one to test for a non-monotonic 
relationship between the responsiveness of growth to capital account openness and 
institutional quality is  
[14] 




5 4 3 2 , 76 1 , 95 76 ln ln  
where ∆lnY76-95,i  is the change in the natural logarithm of real per capital income between 
1976 and 1995 of country i, lnY76,i  is the natural logarithm of real per capita income in 
1976 for country i,  κi is an indicator of capital account openness of country i, and Qi  is 
an indicator of institutional quality for country i.
18  In this specification, γ, the 
responsiveness of the steady state level of output to the indicator of capital account 
openness, is    
                                                           
18 The matrix Zi includes variables that are typical included in cross-country growth 
regressions (and are included in the model in Section 2), such as the logarithm of the 
secondary school enrollment rate (a proxy for E), the average rate of investment to GDP 
over the years 1974 to 1978 (which, in the steady state, is related to the variables sH and 
sK), and the growth rate of the population between 1976 and 1995 (the parameter n).  As 
is often the case in empirical investigations of growth, one of the columns of the matrix 
Zi  represents a dummy variable for African countries.  The model suggests the 
importance of including the world interest rate as a regressor, but, in a cross-section panel 
regression, this variable, which is the same for all countries, is subsumed in the constant.    19




5 4 3 i i i Q Q Q × + × + × + = β β β β γ . 
This specification nests a model in which the effect of capital account openness on 
growth does not depend upon institutional quality (that is, a model in which β4 = 0, β5 = 
0, and β6 = 0), a model in which γ varies in a linear fashion with institutional quality (in 
which case β5 = 0 and β6 = 0), and a model in which γ varies in a quadratic fashion (a 
model in which β6 = 0).  A positive value for β5 and a negative value for β6 is consistent 
with an inverted-U shaped relationship between γ and Qi. 
  Another hypothesis from the model presented in Section 2 is that the rate of 
convergence depends upon the proportion of years a country had an open capital account.  
We test this hypothesis by augmenting specification [14] with a variable that represents 
the interaction of initial income and capital account openness, as shown in 
[15]




5 4 3 2 , 76 , 76 1 , 95 76 ln ln ln
 
The rate of conditional convergence for country i is  ( ) i C κ β β × + 1 .  The model presented 
in Section 2 predicts that a longer period with an open capital account contributes to a 
faster rate of conditional convergence.  A test of this hypothesis is whether βC  is 
significant and negative.
19   
                                                           
19 The partial derivative of growth with respect to capital account openness in [15] is  




5 4 3 , 76 ln i i i i C Q Q Q Y × + × + × + + × = β β β β β γ . 
Initial income is significantly correlated with institutional quality, so we use the 
estimated values from the regression  
i i i u Q Y + + = 1 0 , 76 ln π π , 
the results of which are reported in Table 3, to calculate the estimated value of γ from 
specification [15] as    




5 4 3 1 0 ) ˆ ˆ ( i i i i C Q Q Q Q × + × + × + + + × = β β β β π π β γ . 
    20
  While the empirical specification [14] is flexible, since it nests a range of possible 
interactions between γ and Q, in the interest of robustness the empirical results also 
include two other specifications that allow for an interaction between capital account 
openness and institutional quality.  One specification replaces the interaction terms in 
[14] with a quadratic spline, 
[16] 




1 3 2 , 76 1 , 95 76 ) ˆ ( ) ( ln ln  
where  KNOT Q ˆ  is the estimated knot of the spline, Mi is a dummy variable that equals 0 for 
values of   KNOT i Q Q ˆ ≤  and otherwise equals 1, and  MIN Q  is the minimum value of 
institutional quality in the sample.  In this specification, the responsiveness of growth to 




1 3 ) ˆ ( ) ( KNOT i i MIN i SPLINE Q Q M Q Q − + − + = ω ω β γ  
Equation [16] is estimated through non-linear techniques that allow for the joint 
estimation of the β and ω coefficients as well as  KNOT Q ˆ  (which determines Mi). 
  A third specification, one that is even less restrictive in its parameterization, 
estimates different coefficients for the effect of capital account liberalization on growth 
for each quintile of institutional quality, as shown by   
[17]  i i i j
j





2 , 76 1 , 95 76 ln ln  
where Di represents a dummy variable that equals 1 if country i is in the j
th quintile for 
institutional quality, and is otherwise equal to zero.  The value and pattern of significance 
of the estimates of the five  j α  coefficients can be used to confirm the results derived    21
from specifications [14] and [16] as to whether, in fact, the effect of capital account 
openness on economic growth varies systematically with institutional quality.  
 
3.2 Capital Account Openness, Institutional Quality and Growth  
  This section presents estimation results in several ways.  The estimated 
coefficients from regressions along with their standard errors are presented in Table 2.  
The OLS estimate of [14], the OLS estimate of [15], the IV estimate of [14], the non-
linear least squares estimate of [16], and the estimate of [17] that includes the indicator of 
capital account openness, κi, interacted with the institutional quality quintile dummy 
variables are reported in Columns 1 – 5, respectively.   
  The results in Columns 1 – 4, however, do not provide a transparent answer to the 
central question of this paper, how the responsiveness of growth to capital account 
openness varies with institutional quality.  Therefore, the lower panel of Table 2 also 





th percentile values of Qi.
20  This table also reports the number of countries that have 
values of Qi such that the estimated value of γ is significant, and the percentiles spanned 
by this set of countries.      
  An even more clear representation of the results in Columns 1 – 5 is provided in 
Figures 2 – 6, respectively.  Each of these figures plots, for one of the specifications 
reported in Table 2, the estimated value of γ (in a line in which filled circles represent 
                                                           
20 The lower part of Column 5 presents the coefficients on the interaction of κi with the 
quintile dummy variables, where the percentile listed in the left column represents the 
midpoint of that quintile (i.e., the row labeled “10
th Percentile” presents the coefficient 
for κi for the first quintile, the row labeled “30
th Percentile” presents the coefficient for κi 
for the second quintile, and so on).      22
estimates of γi for actual values of Qi), along with the associated 95 percent confidence 
intervals (dashed lines).  Figures 3, 4, 5, and 6 also include plots of γ as estimated in 
Column 1 (as diamonds unconnected by a line) for purposes of comparing results across 
specifications and estimation methods.  Figures 2 – 5 also include a vertical line drawn at 
the smallest value of Qi at which γ is significant at the 95 percent level of confidence, and 
another vertical line drawn at the largest value of Qi at which γ is significant at the 95 
percent level of confidence. 
  The OLS estimate of Specification [14], reported in Column 1 of Table 2, and 
represented in Figure 2, shows that capital account openness is a significant determinant 
of growth over the period 1976 to 1995 for a set of countries with above-median levels of 
institutional quality.  The coefficient on κi  itself, as well as the coefficient on each of the 
three interaction terms, κi  × Qi, κi  × Qi
2, and κi  × Qi
3, are significant at better than the 95  
percent level of confidence.  This suggests that a cubic interaction between κi and Qi, as 
opposed to no interaction, a linear interaction, or a quadratic interaction, is warranted.  
The lower panel of Table 2 shows that, with this specification and estimation method, 17 
of the 71 countries in the sample (23.9 percent of the countries) have a value of γ that is 
significant.  The set of countries represents those with institutional quality ranging from 
the 55
th percentile (Mexico) to the 79
th percentile (Ireland). 
  The quantitative effect of having an open capital account is economically 
meaningful, as well as statistically significant, for countries with institutional quality 
between that of Mexico and Ireland.  For example, consider two hypothetical countries 
that are similar along all relevant dimensions, including initial income and their 
institutional quality.  The strongest support for the opening sentence of this paragraph can     23
   Table 2: Growth, Capital Account Liberalization, & Institutional Quality 
  1: OLS  2: OLS  3: IV  4: Non-linear LS Spline  5: OLS 
lnY1976,i -0.396  -0.374  -0.295  -0.371  -0.380 
(s.e.)  (0.136) (0.158) (0.138)  (0.100)  (0.137) 
lnY76× κi   -0.217      
(s.e.)     (0.376)       
Q,i 0.439  0.424  0.439  0.415  0.438 
(s.e.) (0.097)  (0.114)  (0.187)  (0.077)  (0.096) 
κi  12.325  14.967  15.905 0.181 
(s.e.)  (5.925) (6.455) (24.166) 
 
(0.430) 
(κi  x Q,i )  -8.388   -9.317  -12.049  ω1
  0.046 
(s.e.)  (3.863) (3.796) (15.393)  (s.e.)  (0.069) 
(κi  x Q,i 
2 )   1.861   2.065  2.848  ω2  -0.477 
(s.e.)  (0.806) (0.799) (3.122)  (s.e.)  (0.360) 
(κi  x Qi 
3 )  -0.131  -0.143  -0.210  Knot  5.218 








 Ln(School)  0.058 0.053 -0.074   0.033 0.030 
(s.e.)  (0.093) (0.095) (0.178)  (0.106)  (0.093) 
InvestAv’g 74 – 78  0.016  0.015  0.023  0.018  0.015 
(s.e.)  (0.008) (0.008) (0.019)  (0.008)  (0.009) 
Pop.Growth  -0.712  -0.712  -0.967  -0.773  -0.557 
(s.e.)  (0.410) (0.414) (0.781)  (0.389)  (0.404) 
Africa  -0.628 -0.632 -0.599  -0.638  -0.701 
(s.e.)  (0.157) (0.159) (0.231) 
 
(0.172) (0.151) 
Percentiles Overall  Effect,  γi, for i at listed percentiles of Qi  αi 
10
th Percentile   0.417  0.057  -0.342  0.189  0.526 
(s.e.)  (0.358) (0.379) (0.720)  (0.419)  (0.408) 
30
th Percentile  0.123  0.148  -0.097  0.266  -1.322 
(s.e.)  (0.243) (0.244) (0.731)  (0.329)  (0.999) 
50
th Percentile  0.249  0.251  0.367  0.350  -0.257 
(s.e.)  (0.203) (0.206) (0.599)  (0.251)  (0.331) 
70
th Percentile  0.664 0.684 0.613  0.573  0.572 
(s.e.)  (0.186) (0.187) (0.286)  (0.200)  (0.278) 
90
th Percentile  -0.151 -0.126 -1.384  -0.318  -0.147 
(s.e.)  (0.236) (0.239) (1.183)  (0.326)  (0.221) 























2  0.732 0.745  0.61  0.73  0.73 
No. of obs.  71  71  59  71  71 
Bold = significant > 95% level of confidence, Italic = sig. at 90% to 95% level of conf.  
Column 4:  ω1 is coef. on κi (Q-QMIN)
2, ω2 is coef. on M× κi (Q-QKN)
2 
Column 5: αi represents estimate at for midpoint of i
th quintile 
* by construction, (number / quintile) × (number of sig. quintile coefficients)    24
be made by assuming that Q equals 5.75 for both of these economies (the level of 
institutional quality for Korea) since γ reaches a maximum value of 0.67 at this level of 
Q.  If one of these countries maintained capital controls throughout the sample period 
while the other kept an open capital account, the estimated annual average growth rate of 
the open economy would be 3.35 percentage points greater than that of the closed 
economy, and the open economy would be 95 percent bigger than the closed economy 
after two decades.  Of course, this is the maximum difference that is obtained with these 
estimates.  But differences are notable with other assumed values of κi and Qi  as well.  
For example, at Q = 4.64, a level of institutional quality just below that of Mexico, the 
point of the lower 95 percent confidence bound in the estimate with constant 
convergence, the estimated value of γ is 0.357.  This suggests a difference of 1.79 
percentage points in annual growth between a fully closed and a fully open economy, and 
a difference of 43 percent in per capita income after two decades.  Even comparing two 
economies for which Q = 4.64, with one that is closed and one that is open only during 
the second half of the sample, there is a difference of 0.893 percentage points in the 
annual growth rate, a difference that would result in a difference of 20 percent between 
the continually closed and periodically open economy after two decades.
21                
  While these results strongly support one prediction of the model presented in 
Section 2, another prediction, that an open economy experiences more rapid conditional 
convergence than a closed economy, is not consistent with the empirical results.  Column 
                                                           
21 These values of γ are broadly consistent with those presented in the theoretical model 
since the estimates of γ in the theoretical model represent effects on average annual 
growth and, consequently, the values of γ from the theoretical model must be multiplied 
by 20 to be compared them to the estimates of γ presented here. For example, the value of 
20 times the maximum values of γ presented in Table 2 ranges from 0.428 to 0.47.     25
2 presents the estimates from Specification [15] that allows for the possibility of varying 
conditional convergence through the inclusion of the interaction between initial income 
and the indicator of capital account openness.  As predicted by the theory, the estimated 
value of this interaction term is negative, but it is not significant (the p-value is 0.57).
22
 The  estimated  γ obtained with varying conditional convergence is almost identical 
to the γ obtained under the assumption of constant conditional convergence.
23  In Figure 
3, the estimates of γ for varying conditional convergence (represented by the line with the 
filled circles on it) and under the assumption of constant conditional convergence 
(represented by the unconnected diamonds) track each other very closely.  In fact, as 
shown in the lower panels of Columns 1 and 2 in Table 2, the set of countries with a 
significant value of γ for the varying conditional convergence estimate is the same as that 
for the constant conditional convergence estimate.  Therefore, because of the lack of 
support for varying conditional convergence, and the similarity of results concerning how 
γ varies with Q across these two specifications, all further results presented here consider 
only the case of constant conditional  convergence.     
  Column 3 of Table 2 presents instrumental variable estimates of Specification 
[14], and Figures 4 plots the associated estimate of γ, along with its 95 percent 
confidence interval.  The instruments used in these estimates include κi for the period 
1970 to 1974, similarly constructed indicators of current account openness, a multiple 
exchange rate regime, and surrender of export proceeds, the average of trade divided by  
                                                           
22 Sachs and Warner (1995) argue that unconditional convergence is more rapid in open 
economies, although their definition of openness differs from the one used here. 
23 The estimates from a specification with a varying rate of convergence employ the 
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Figure 3: Gamma, Varying Conditional Convergence   27
GDP over the period 1970 to 1974, Quinn’s (1997) indicator of the intensity of capital 
account controls in 1973 and his indicator of the intensity of current account controls for 
that year, and a set of regional dummy variables.  These instruments are used for κi as 
well as the for interactions of κi with institutional quality.
24     
  The lower panel of Columns 3 shows that fewer countries have a significant 
estimated value of γ with IV estimates than with OLS estimates, a result partially due to 
the smaller sample available for the IV estimates, but also one typically found when 
comparing IV to OLS estimates.  Figure 4 also shows, however, that over the range of 
values of Qi for which γ is significant in the IV estimates, or even over the larger range of 
values of Qi for which γ is significant in the OLS estimates, the IV and OLS estimates of 
γ track each other closely.                  
  The fourth column of Table 2 presents the estimates of Specification [16] which 
includes a quadratic spline, with the knot of the spline estimated simultaneously with the 
coefficients of the regression using nonlinear least squares.  The lower panel of this 
column shows that 9 countries, those with institutional quality between the 62
nd and 73
rd 
percentiles, have significant estimated effects of capital account openness on growth.  
The size of the estimated effect for the 70
th percentile is only about 16 percent different 
than the effect for the country at that same percentile using Specification [14].   
  The similarity between the estimated effects of institutional quality on the 
responsiveness of economic growth to capital account openness in the spline and cubic 
interaction specifications is shown more fully in Figure 5.  The plot of γ estimated with a 
quadratic spline specification (the line with the filled circles) as well as the plot of γ from 
                                                           
24 The R
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Figure 5: Gamma, Quadratic Spline   29
the basic cubic interaction (the unconnected diamonds) track each other closely.  Figure 5 
also includes the upper and lower 95 percent confidence intervals for γ, as well as the 
lower 95 percent confidence interval for γ if the estimated value of the knot, 5.218, is 
treated as a known parameter rather than an estimate.  This latter confidence interval 
gives a much wider range of significant values of γ (even though the p-value for the 
estimate of the knot is less than 0.001), as shown by the dashed vertical lines, with 23 of 
the 71 countries having estimates of γ that are significant at better than the 95 percent 
level of confidence when the value of the knot is treated as a parameter of the model.   
  The final column in Table 2 presents the estimates of Specification [17] in which 
κi  is interacted with a set of dummy variables representing the quintiles of institutional 
quality.  The results in this column show that the coefficient on κi is only significant for 
the 4
th quintile, that is, from the 60
th percentile to the 80
th percentile.  This corresponds 
closely to the more parameterized results presented in Columns 1 and 2, where significant 
values of γ are obtained for countries between the 55
th and 79
th percentiles.  Also, the 
estimated value of γ of 0.572 for the 4
th quintile is within the range of significant values 
of γ from the estimates in Columns 1 and 2 of 0.357 to 0.670.   
  The close correspondence between the estimates of γ from Specification [14] and 
Specification [17] is also demonstrated by Figure 6.  This figure shows that the 4
th 
quintile, for which institutional quality ranges form 4.81 to 6.67, is the only one in which 
the confidence interval for γ does not overlap zero.  In this range, the estimated values of 
γ from Specification [14], represented by the unconnected diamonds, closely correspond 
to the estimate from Specification [17].  Thus, the overall result for the effect of    30
institutional quality on the responsiveness of growth to capital account openness is robust 
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4. Conclusion 
The debate over the consequences of capital account liberalization tends to be 
painted in broad strokes of black and white.  This paper suggests a more nuanced 
approach, one that allows for shades of gray.   
The model in this paper presents a logical framework demonstrating that the 
effect of capital account liberalization on economic growth varies with institutional 
quality.  Estimates from several empirical specifications consistent with this model 
suggest that an open capital account can make a statistically significant and economically 
meaningful contribution to economic growth.  But, as predicted by the theory presented 
earlier in the paper, this estimated effect varies with institutional quality.  In particular,  
the effect of capital account openness on growth is found to be statistically significant for  
about one–quarter of the countries in the sample, and these countries tend to be ones with 
better (though not the best) institutions.  There is a strong correlation between 
institutional quality and income per capita, and the countries that tend to benefit 
significantly from capital account liberalization are mostly upper-middle-income 
countries.   
At a policy level, the results presented in this paper answer, to some extent, the 
critics of capital account liberalization who assert that its benefits have not been 
demonstrated.  But the model and empirical results presented here do not offer an 
unqualified endorsement of capital account liberalization either.  Instead, the main 
message of this paper is that the environment in which this policy takes place can have an 
important effect on its consequences.    32
 Data Appendix 
Indicators of Capital Account Openness and Institutional Quality 
  In this data appendix we discuss the indicators of capital account openness and 
institutional quality used in the regressions.   
A.1  Indicator of Capital Account Openness  
  The theoretical model presented in Section 2 includes the parameter κ that 
represents the proportion of years that a country had a continuously open capital account.  
For the empirical analysis in this paper, we construct the indicator of capital account 
openness κi that represents the proportion of years between 1976 and 1995 that country i 
is recorded a country as having an open capital account by the Annual Report on 
Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions (AREAER), a publication of the 
International Monetary Fund.
25   This indicator has been used in other empirical studies 
of the effects of capital account openness on growth, including Grilli and Milesi-Ferretti 
(1995), Rodrik (1998) and Klein and Olivei (1999).
26  
                                                           
25 Every issue of the Annual Report on Exchange Arrangements and Exchange 
Restrictions published between 1967 (which refers to conditions in 1966) and 1996 
(which refers to conditions in 1995) includes a summary table in which row E.2, labeled 
“Restrictions on payments for capital transactions,” addresses the presence or absence of 
capital controls. The 1997 issue of Annual Report on Exchange Arrangements and 
Exchange Restrictions
 expanded the summary information on capital controls including, 
for the first time, a distinction between restrictions on inflows and restrictions on 
outflows.  Unfortunately, this new classification system cannot be mapped into the early 
system, making the use of a panel bridging the pre-1996 and post-1996 data problematic.     
26 An alternative empirical indicator of capital account openness developed by Dennis 
Quinn (1997) attempts to record the intensity of controls.  Quinn’s indicators are only 
available for a limited set of years for non-industrial countries.  Edison, Klein, Sløk and 
Ricci (2004) compare κi to Quinn’s indicators        33
  Table A.1 presents some statistics and information on κi. The IMF publication 
records that about half of the countries in the data set (36 of the 71 countries for which 
we have full data) had closed capital accounts throughout this period.  Among the 35 
countries that had some experience with open capital accounts (a set that includes all 17 
industrial countries in the sample), 6 were recorded as having had open capital accounts 
each year from 1976 to 1995; the United States, Belgium, the Netherlands, Canada, 
Malaysia and Hong Kong.
  
  As defined here, κi does not distinguish between a one-time liberalization and an 
on-again, off-again pattern of capital account restrictions.  Fortunately, in the large 
majority of observations in the data set, κi corresponds directly to κ in the theoretical 
model, that is, it reflects an early period with capital account restrictions and, if nonzero, 
a later period with an open capital account.  For the 29 countries where κi did not equal 0 
or 1, the governments of 20 of them (all 14 industrial countries and 6 of the 15 non-
industrial countries that had a value of κi greater than 0 but less than 1) did not close the 
capital accounts once it was opened.
27     
  
 
Table A.1: Capital Account Openness Indicator 
κi  = proportion of years with open capital accounts 
(from IMF Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions) 
71 observations, 36 = 0, 35 ≠ 0. 










                                                           
27 For details on this, see Edison, Klein, Ricci and Sløk (2004).    34
A.2   Indicator of Institutional Quality 
  A variety of indicators of institutional quality have been used in empirical 
research.  The composite indicator used in this paper, Qi, represents, for country i, the 
1984 to 1995 average of five series from the data set constructed by Steve Knack and 
Philip Keefer of the IRIS Center at the University of Maryland; Bureaucratic Quality, 
Control of Corruption in Government, Risk of Expropriation, Repudiation of Government 
Contracts, and Rule of Law (Law and Order Tradition).  These series are based on data 
from the International Country Risk Guide, published by the PRS Group. 
28  A higher 
value for any of the indicators represents a higher quality of an institution so, for 
example, a higher score for Repudiation of Government Contracts means less of a risk of 
repudiation and a higher score for Risk of Expropriation means a smaller risk.     
  Table A.2 presents some statistics for Qi.  Panel A shows the minimum and 





th percentiles, for 
the 71 observations in the sample.  The regression of the logarithm of income per capita 
in 1976 on Qi , presented in Panel B, shows a highly significant link between the 
logarithm of initial income per capita and institutional quality.
29  The results in Panel C 
show that there is a very high correlation between all five components of the overall 
indicator of institutional quality.  This high correlation explains why the results of the 
estimates presented below are largely unchanged if any single component is used rather 
than the average of all five, as well as if a different weighting scheme is used to calculate 
the overall indicator of institutional quality. 
                                                           
28 See http://www.prsgroup.com/icrg/icrg.html. 
29 As mentioned in footnote 15, this estimate is used to evaluate γ in specification [15].    35
 
Table A.2: Institutional Quality Indicator and Its Components 
A. Statistics of Composite Institutional Quality Indicator 








2.449  2.886  3.803  4.358 5.574 6.957 7.22 
                                    
B. Regression of ln(GDP1976) on Composite Institutional Quality Indicator 
 Constant  lnY1976,i 
Coefficient  3.299 0.772 
 
(s.e.) (0.244)  (0.042) 
 
R




                                    
C. Correlation of Components of Composite Institutional Quality Indicator 










1.00      
Control of 
Corruption 
0.9998 1.00     
Risk of 
Expropriation 
0.9996 0.9991  1.00   
Government 
Reputation 
0.9998 0.9994  0.9999  1.00 
Rule of Law  0.9999 0.9999  0.9994  0.9994 
 
    36
References 
 
Alfaro, Laura, Sebnem Kalemli-Ozcan and Vadym Volosovych, 2003, “Why Doesn’t 
Capital Flow from Rich to Poor Countries?” mimeo. 
 
___________, 2005, “Capital Flows in a Globalized World: The Role of Policies and 
Institutions,” NBER Working Paper no. 11696, October.  
 
Arteta, Carlos, Barry Eichengreen and Charles Wyplosz, 2003, “When Does Capital 
Account Liberalization Help More Than It Hurts?” in Elhanan Helpman and 
Efraim Sadka, eds., Economic Policy in the International Economy, Cambridge 
University Press, pp. 177 - 206.  
 
Barro, Robert, N. Gregory Mankiw and Xavier Sala-i-Martin, 1995, “Capital Mobility in 
Neoclassical Models of Growth,” American Economic Review, vol 85, no. 1, 
(March), pp. 103 – 115.  
 
Bhagwati, Jagdish, 1998, “The Capital Myth: The Difference Between Trade in Widgets 
and Trade in Dollars,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 77, pp. 7–12. 
 
Edison, Hali, Michael W. Klein, Luca Ricci and Torsten Sløk, 2004, “Capital Account 
Liberalization and Economic Growth: Survey and Synthesis,” International 
Monetary Fund Staff Papers, vol. 51, no. 2, pp. 22 – 256, August. 
 
Edwards, Sebastian, “Capital Mobility and Economic Performance: Are Emerging 
Markets Different?” in Horst Siebert, ed., The World’s New Financial Landscape: 
Challenges for Policy, Springer Publishers, c. 2001, pp. 219 – 244. 
 
Froot, K. A., and Jeremy Stein. 1991, “Exchange Rates and Foreign Direct Investment: 
An Imperfect Capital Markets Approach,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, vol. 
106 (November), pp. 1191-1217. 
 
Grilli, Vittorio, and Gian Maria Milesi-Ferretti, 1995, “Economic Effects and Structural 
Determinants of Capital Controls,” IMF Staff Papers, Vol. 42, No. 3, pp. 517–51. 
 
International Monetary Fund, 2000, Report of the Managing Director to the 
  International Monetary and Financial Committee on Progress in Strengthening 
  the Architecture of the International Financial System and Reform of the IMF, 
 September  19. 
Klein, Michael W., “Capital Account Openness and the Varieties of Growth Experience,” 
  NBER Working Paper no. 9500, February 2003. 
 
___________, and Giovanni Olivei, 1999, “Capital Account Liberalization, Financial 
Depth and Economic Growth,” N.B.E.R. Working Paper no. 7384, October. 
    37
Mankiw, N. Gregory, David Romer and David N. Weil, 1992, “A Contribution to the 
Empirics of Economic Growth,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, vol. 107, no.l 
2, (May), pp. 407 – 437. 
 
Quinn, Dennis, 1997, “The Correlates of Change in International Financial Regulation,” 
American Political Science Review, Vol. 91, No. 3, (September), pp. 531–51. 
 
Rodrik, Dani, 1998, “Who Needs Capital-Account Convertibility?” in Stanley Fischer, et 
al., Should the IMF Pursue Capital Account Convertibility? Essays in 
International Finance, No. 207, International Finance Section, Department of 
Economics, Princeton University, Princeton, N.J., (May). 
 
___________, 1999, The New Global Economy and Developing Countries: Making  
Openness Work, Overseas Development Council, Policy Essay no. 24, 
Washington, D.C., distributed by the Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, 
Maryland.  
 
Rogoff, Kenneth S., 2002, “Rethinking Capital Controls: When should we keep an open  
mind?,” Finance and Development, December, pp. 55 – 56. 
 
Sachs, Jeffrey D., and Andrew Warner, 1995, “Economic Reform and the Process of  
 Global  Integration,”  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, vol. 1, pp. 1 – 95. 
 
 